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This study analyzes incumbent entry timing decisions in new markets in the case of 
Encryption Software (ES). In ES first technological movers were slow to enter the 
downstream market, losing their initial advantages to the benefit of newcomers. This 
work tests the hypothesis that this wait-and-see strategy was an optimal choice 
compared to the assumption of inertia embedded in the decision process of potential 
entrants. We find that entry decision is not the outcome of firm rational balancing 
among different strategic variables, but it is more similar to a heuristic process that 
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Can imitators take advantage of the knowledge developed by technology pioneers 
and by their eventual strategic mistakes? 
In answering this question, entry timing takes central stage as one of the most 
important variables of firm choice, at least as well critical as the decision of “where'' to 
enter.  This represents an underestimated approach  given that large part of the 
existing literature has focused on the relationship between incumbent competencies 
and the trajectories of firm diversification (see for a survey Silvermann, 1999), almost 
ignoring how entry timing decisions could affect this process. 
In order to study incumbent entry process, we first highlight two essential regularities 
observed in many industries. One is that large established firms carry out the most 
important part of R&D investments to explore new technological trajectories and to 
build a diversified technological portfolio. They also produce by far the largest part of 
world innovations and patents (Pavel and Pavitt, 1997). Moreover, especially in 
software, patents are increasingly held by large firms (Bessen and Hunt, 2003). 
Second, by the same token, a wide collection of industry cases (Hendersons, 1993; 
Schnaars, 1994; Shane, 2001) shows how often incumbents that own the required 
technological and commercial assets prefer to adopt wait-and-see and catching-up 
strategies, l eaving to new ventures the task to open new markets. In addition, 
empirical evidence (Christensen, 1997; Bhide, 2000) suggests that not only founders 
of innovative start-ups are often former employees of large established firms, but that 
they also shaped t heir projects exploiting “sleeping” resources of mature 
organisations.  
Taken this viewpoint, the creation of new markets and the diffusion of innovations are 
generated by the interaction between the ability of late-comer incumbents in leap-
frogging market pioneers and first mover advantages gained by first product 
developers that were imitators of the leading technology
3 (Carroll et al., 1996). It is 
straightforward that incumbent entry timing decisions are at the foundations of the 
process, since they could explain how and when a new industry emerges and what 
organizations are the main actors in the different industry phases. 
The aim of this work is to understand if, aware of these “rules of the game”, 
incumbents take strategic entry decisions exploiting all their existing resources. Or, 
conversely, if firm entry decisions are more driven by “rule of the thumb'' mechanisms 
that fail to take in account all the information available. 
In so doing, we show how in the Encryption Software Industry (ESI), our case study, 
first technological movers were late to enter into downstream markets, leaving 
newcomers the opportunity to dominate the industry. Then, after reviewing the 
existing literature, we discuss the research hypotheses and test them with three 
econometric models. We find that incumbent entry timing decision in ESI is not the 
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direct outcome of a process of long run decision on timing, but a “sub-product'' of an 
entry-vs-no entry choice that firms tend to repeat. 
This issue opens also the discussion on the rationality of large firm investments in 
wide-diversified knowledge inventories (Miller, 2002): is this really a rational strategy 
with expectations of long run returns, or are incumbents to some extent generating 
technological resources that other organisations will exploit? 
 
 
THE ENCRYPTION SOFTW ARE INDUSTRY
 
Providing novel empirical evidence, ESI is an ideal case study, which includes all the 
issues we presented in the Introduction. ESI shows how first innovators could not (or 
do not want to) exploit all the technological competencies they created and to some 
respect, they could lose their initial advantage to the benefit of new comers. During 
the mid 1970s, the market opportunities arising from the military sector spurred 
established electronic firms to accumulate knowledge in Encryption Software 
Technology
4. 
Table 1 shows the most important firms for patents granted and cited in USPTO 380 
class “Cryptology'' between 1976 and 1992. Large ICT firms and university 
departments were the first technological movers. 
 
[Table 1 about here.] 
 
A previous study (Giarratana, 2004) gives evidence of the importance of 
mathematical algorithms and patents as protection tools in ESI, especially in USPTO 
class 380. A crypto algorithm is a procedure that takes the plain text data and 
transforms it into cipher text. This process could be reversed with a secret key (the 
usual password). The core of security products is the mathematical procedure that 
lies behind the encryption of data. Patents offer therefore a good protection 
mechanism against imitation and preservation of intellectual proprietary rights. 
From the second half of the 1980s, the industry landscape has mostly changed. The 
development of the PC market and Internet gave rise to a demand for civilian 
purposes, introducing new market needs and products in the industry
5. International 
Data Corporation
6 evaluated the world market of ESI at 2.17 billion dollars in 1997 
and 3.2 billion dollars in 1998, with an estimate of 4.4 billion dollars for 1999. 
Offering a wide array of products from the basic products of encryption to advanced 
security services, ESI could be now defined as an industry specialised in the design, 
market development and support of security software, solutions, and products that 
protect data and software on computers and networks. 
The increased civilian demand has spurred a flow of firm entry since 1989, the year 
when the first product was released on the market. Figure 1 shows firm entry, exit 
and the number of firms on the market between 1989 and 2001. It is worth noticing 
that most part of the entry is by start-ups, and not by incumbent diversification. 
 
[Figure 1 about here.] 
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Moreover, also in ESI, founders of most start-ups were former employees of large 
firms and university research departments (Giarratana, 2004).  
However, if we look at the most important firms for patents granted in the period 
1993-1999 (see Table 2), large established firms again played the major role
7. 
 
[Table 2 about here.] 
 
Notwithstanding this evidence, in terms of market share, Hoover’s data show that by 
1998 the top 15 firms in ESI were all start-ups, accounting for about 43% of the total 
world market (Giarratana, 2004). 
These top 15 start-ups were granted 88 patents in 380 USPTO class by 1999, with a 
total of 446 backward citations.  Looking at the most important firms cited by these 88 
patents, large ICT firms still remained in the leading positions. This highlights a 
technological dependence of start-up technology upon the knowledge created by 
large firms (see Table 3).   
 
[Table 3 about here.] 
 
Large ICT firms that were the first technological movers and the largest producers of 
patented inventions, entered into ESI with their own products in the last years of the 
1990s, on average 5 -6 years after the first successful products of start-ups. In 
particular, IBM in 1998 and H&P in 1999 began to offer a broad range of software 
security products
8 . 
The evidence presented strongly suggests that, in ESI as in other industries, mature 
organisations choose to enter only when the new market was consolidated, exploiting 
their commercial and downstream strength. This happened even when large firms 
were technological first-movers and main patentees of the core technology. 
Widespread theoretical (Rubin, 1973; Teece et al.,1994) and empirical (Silverman, 
1999; Montgomery, 1994) literature on diversification sustains the long term success 
of a resource based firm diversification, originated by economies of scope from firm 
knowledge base. If we follow this view, for most large technological first movers, ESI 
would have been a case of a coherent knowledge based diversification. The history 
of ESI leads us to investigate why large firms were so quick to enter the technological 
race, creating valuable competencies 20 years before the development  of ESI. 
However, they lagged behind newcomers in the market for products. Note that if an 
incumbent potential entrant had been the ESI market leader at 1998, it would have 
increased its total revenues on average of about 6%.  
In particular, we are interested in understanding if the wait-and-see behaviour was a 
rational and conscious strategy or if large firms were affected by some sort of inertia. 
ESI is a classical case of a trade-off between the advantages of late entrants and first 
movers (Mueller, 1997). If start-ups have been able to achieve sound and not easily 
replicable first mover advantages, it could be the case that ESI will be dominated in 
the future by small-medium size specialised firms. 
If first mover advantages are small compared to the technological and commercial 
strength of large established firms, ESI will be a good case study to understand the 
role played by new firms in the exploration of new technological fields and in the 
formation of new market niches that in the long run will be served by large firms. 
                                                 
7 See Mowery et al., and Jaffe et al., for a comprehensive survey of patent citations. 
8 “H&P and IBM go head to head on Net Security”, Unix and NT News, Feb. 1999, p. 14.   6
 
 
THE LITERATURE SURVE Y 
 
The “rational'' approach 
Many contributions show how incumbents are more likely to be followers than first 
movers into new product areas (Scherer, 1980; Schnaars, 1994). The decision not to 
be a first mover could be a rational decision of many large companies that prefer to 
adopt a strategy of waiting until new markets are large enough and customer 
preferences consolidated (Christensen, 1997).  
Mitchell (Mitchell, 1991; 1989) points out that early entry could convey risks for large 
firms especially if new markets require their own specialised downstream assets that 
are difficult to build rapidly. While the time of entry is important in determining the 
survival probability of start-ups, incumbent survival rate is only affected by the time of 
entry of other incumbents.  
Incumbents usually perform better in strategies of imitation and catching-up, once 
newcomers have tested new products and markets. An established firm will always 
be confident to compete easily against small start-ups, due to a scale effect. 
However, incumbents could be threatened when competitors of a similar dimension 
enter the market. Entry delays when market turbulence decreases allows large firms 
not to search their competitive advantages on short  run disequilibria. The costs of 
imitation and late entry are usually evaluated lower then those originating from the 
uncertainties of new markets.  
Moreover, mature organisations have low incentives to enter in new market niches 
because of the possibility  of cannibalisation of their existing products. New goods 
may reduce sales of existing products (Klepper, 2001; Tushman and Anderson, 
1986). For Aron and Lazear (1990) an incumbent entry decision must include the 
costs of lost revenues from sales of existing products when a new one is introduced. 
Incumbents tend to be reluctant to open up new markets and are induced to follow. 
Conservative strategies are the best strategies for most industry successful 
corporations that start competing in new markets until t he number of existing 
competitors reaches a certain point. According to Cho et al. (1988), late entry for 
many firms may be the only realistic option given their competitive dynamics. 
Numerous established competence rich companies allow early movers to test the 
market and only when market signals are positive, they enter and compete. 
Numerous examples in various industries are available (Schnaars, 1994). Large 
companies have great opportunity costs in investing resources into risky markets, 
and they wait until market leaders emerge to learn and imitate from them (the so-
called benchmarking strategy). In so doing, entry of large companies occurs when 
new industries and market characteristics become similar to those of existing market 
areas (Smith and Cooper, 1988). 
Finally, Kats and Shapiro (1987) show that when a product could be easily imitated 
an incumbent will often benefit by delaying entry. 
 
The “inertia” approach 
A massive stream of heterogeneous literature discusses the relationship between 
economic decisions and general bounded rationality (Conlisk, 1986). To narrow the 
field of analysis, in this section we select only the works that focus on the problem of 
firm decisions and inertia. The aim is to compare the idea of rationality as the best   7
behaviour given the perceived opportunities with a heuristic decision process that fail 
to accommodate the full logic of decision. 
At this regard, Henderson and Clark (1990) highlight two levels of problems 
associated with large firm difficulties to cope with innovation breakthrough and 
market birth. One level refers to a cognitive part of large firm entry decisions. Large 
organisations could show inefficiencies during the phase of recognition and 
interpretation of the environment, a preliminary condition of any strategic actions or 
responses. In a seminal work on this aspect, Jelinek (1977) points out the possible 
rigidities that could originate in a complex organisation formed by highly specialised 
functions. These rigidities are mainly generated by the fact that organisations 
interpret their environment with a limited vision, because “they only see what they are 
programmed to perceive'' (p. 21). By the same token, March (1988) suggests that 
firm moves are bounded more by decisions with respect to search then by decisions 
among alternatives, due to the narrow range of alternatives  and consequences that 
firms could consider simultaneously. Authors (Barr, 1998; Grever and Taylor, 2000) 
study the links between the cognitive process of manager teams and the timing and 
content of strategic changes. Assuming that before the elaboration of any strategic 
actions, decision-takers should first mature the interpretation of a specific outcome, 
the interpretation of unfamiliar events is consistent with a common pattern of 
development that goes from vague to broad-based definitions, to detailed and 
specific impacts on the organisation itself (Baum and Wally, 2003). It follows that the 
process of interpretation is time consuming, preventing large organisations from 
responding until the stimulus is interpreted.  Changes in activities are consistent and 
follow changes in interpretations, causing large organisations to prefer an adaptive 
behaviour compared to an anticipating one. Levinthal and March (1993) use the term 
“myopia'' in assessing large firm problems with change and innovation. The authors 
depict firm learning as a unique mechanism to pursue the organisational rationality, 
optimising actions. However “learning has its own traps'' (p. 97), for the reason that 
“problems that are not seen do not exist'' (p. 99). Learning creates a simplified world 
and a specialised organisation. But this process involves a trade-off since strategies 
that allow short run survival tend to increase long term vulnerability. The authors cite 
three major constrains in the contribution of learning to organisational rationality: a) 
learning is directed more to short run events rather than long term ones; b) learning 
is often limited by the stock of competencies of firms, and it is in the strict sense 
local; c) learning does not tend to process and analyse failures, with an over 
evaluation of the successes. Along this view, Christensen (1997) highlights how large 
high performing companies, strongly tailored to existing consumer needs, find very 
difficult to i nvest resources in yet-to-be-formed markets.  Analysing several 
industries, Christensen finds that incumbents fail to enter new markets, even if they 
have developed the required technology. “Finding new markets is a capability that 
firms exhibited once and then lost'' (p. 24). The problem lies in the fact that most 
resources are absorbed in competing in actual markets, while new applications of 
existing competences are ignored since they do not create value in the existing 
environment. The application of firm rationality on future markets and customers is a 
costly process that industries produce when the profitability of existing markets is in 
danger. This view is similar with the one in Brock and Hommes’ (1997): economic 
agents use costly rational tools only when there is high variance in the realized 
profits, while they prefer to use simple and cheap rules of behaviour (consolidated 
organisational routines) when prediction errors are small.  Large firm errors in the 
presence of radical change are rooted in  rational management, since managers   8
apply their rational analysis to existing landscapes, even when creating new markets 
is significantly less risky and more rewarding than competing in established markets 
(Christensen, 1997). 
The second level of inertia stressed by Henderson and Clark could be defined as a  
procedural inertia that makes mature hierarchies inadequate and slow in conducting 
business in new markets with high turbulence, even if the strategic decision speed is 
high. In the stream of literature focused on this aspect, several authors and several 
case studies (Dowell and Swaminathan, 2000; Henderson, 1993; Henderson and 
Clark, 1990; Bresnahan, 1985) illustrate how switching to new modes of learning and 
investing resources in new product architectures is costly for large established firms. 
Re-orienting organisations is a time consuming operation. Breaking previous linkages 
and re-designing channels of information flows could generate difficulties and 
problems inside organisations. Knowledge embedded in routines and channels that 
have guaranteed past competitive advantages, often become inert and difficult to 
change in the presence of new rules of competition.  Direct interviews (Dougherthy 
and Heller, 1994) conducted with large firm employees involved in product innovation 
show how large mature firms might be too slack in learning and adapting to new 
environments. These scholars coin the concept of “barriers to innovation'', referring to 
difficulties in fitting the activities of product innovation into the institutionalised 
routines of large firms. Because dynamic innovators need links to meet user needs, 
then they must coordinate the expertise of different functions within the firm, with firm 
strategy and resources. These links often do not fit into routinized actions in large 
firms. “Innovation do not fit into and it is not part of large firm organisations'' (p.206). 
Studies in population ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) indicate factors (goals, 
authority, core technologies and marketing strategies) that cause structural inertia in 
organisations. They consider learning and structural inertia in a dynamic context, 
where large organisations respond to the occurrences of change, but slowly. Inertia 
appears when the speed of reorganisation is much lower than the rate at which 
external conditions change. The authors interpret inertia as a consequence of 
selection, because firms more able to reproduce a structure with a close fit to the 
existing environment are those that will sustain the major costs in shifting paradigms. 
Complex organisations have slow response times not because they are slow in 
detecting opportunities, but because the process of adjustment takes longer.  
Dougherthy and Hardy (1996) stress how structure and strategies in mature 
organisations reinforce existing practices and became hostile to creativity. One of the 
main problems is to incorporate innovation as a component of the existing 
organisation and strategy, making resources available and providing the necessary 
collaboration of structures and processes (the so-called reframing process).  
In other words, established hierarchies seem to be less efficient in managing 
innovation compared to new businesses that could more easily shift operations on 
arm-length transactions in the market. The presence of pre-existing practices, 
coordination procedures and specificities make it more difficult and time consuming 
to open new product markets. Reframing costs do not affect the process of decision-
making, but only the operational procedures to perform innovation. Large 
organisations are not against innovation, but they make structurally innovation more 
costly to manage since they were configured according to different patterns tailored 
to specific environments.  
Finally, Chesbrough (2000) draws attention to the inefficiencies of firm internal 
financial markets. The author stresses the inability of corporations to provide financial 
incentives that can be easily achieved by an independent start-up. Problems of   9
adverse selection inside organisations show new opportunities as threatening to 
established businesses, making more difficult for new projects to compete for scarce 
corporate resources. In most corporations, management prefers to invest in the 
secure “cash cow" sectors rather then in projects that would gain financial returns in 





Literature (see Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988) assumes that there are two types 
of choice that a firm faces in the contest of entry: i) decision on “entry” versus “not 
entry” ii) decision on entry timing, given the entry. In a nutshell, the entry decision is a 
twofold process that account for the effective profitability of entering in new markets, 
and for the ways this profitability could be strategically improved through correct 
decisions on entry timing. In fact, factors affecting firm entry decision usually differ 
from those that explain firm performance in the long run (Gerosky, 1995; Teece et al., 
1997; Audretsch, 1991; Klepper and Simons, 2000). Granted this point, efficient firms 
should evaluate first if entry is profitable, and then adjust entry timing according to 
their strategies. Thus, we hypothesize that with no inertia, firms choose whether or 
not to enter in a new market, and then, given the entry, the time of entry (e.g. early or 
late). In other words, firms look simultaneously at three possible decisions (not enter, 
enter early and enter late), selecting their best option. In this framework early-
entrants could count on market learning processes and first mover advantages, while 
latecomers, avoiding the turbulence and the uncertainty of the first periods of industry 
evolution, are confident of easily imitating the market leaders (Vanderwerf and 
Mahon, 1997; Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Mitchell, 1989; Levin et al, 1987).  
 
Hypothesis 1a: With no inertia, incumbent firms separate the decision of entry 
(“entry” versus “not entry”) from the decision of entry timing (early or late). 
 
Conversely, suppose now to introduce firm inertia, assuming a firm myopia in the 
form of limited period foresight (Miller, 2002).  With inertia, firm evaluation of entry 
profitability will inevitably merge with the decision of entry timing. In other words, 
there is no ex-ante decision of entry timing, given the strategic and organizational 
difficulties that firms suffer only for taking the decision of entry. Inertia does not 
provide room for using entry timing as a strategic variable. In fact, if we are dealing 
with a cognitive inertia, firms have to regain the time lost in recognizing the actual 
business opportunity. With procedural inertia, selecting the right entry timing is 
unfeasible given the firm rigidity in organizing the entry at different speeds.  
 
Hypothesis 1b: With inertia, firms collapse the decision of “entry” and of “entry 
timing” in a unique decision. 
 
 
The prospect of gaining competitive advantages with entry time fine-tuning indicates 
the existence of firm specific abilities in obtaining profits in targeted markets with 
different entry times. Probability to succeed in new markets with different entry 
choices represents a sort of firm specific asset designed to compete in multiple 
environments. It is clear-cut that given the targeted market, some organizations tend   10
to perform better with a late entry avoiding early instability, while other firms show 
high abilities in rushing into young turbulent industries.   
According to the dynamic capabilities approach (Winter, 2003; Teece et al., 1997), 
firms are characterized by several inner features, part of which is “pre-determined” 
and in some sense “sticky” (for sake of simplicity, we label them A-variables) and part 
of which is more dynamic, competence grounded and aimed to affect performance in 
particular markets (B-variables). A -characteristics are less market-linked variables, 
stem from very old firm decisions and are more difficult to adjust in the short run. On 
the other side, firms could easily move B -variables that directly influence the 
performance in new markets. We could take the example of a US radio producer 
decision to enter in the emerging US television-receiver market
9 during the 1940s. 
This radio producer could own particular technological expertises (e.g. a patented 
shadow mask tube technology) or have recently acquired some local distributor 
central for the television-receiver market. These are clearly B-variables. By contrast, 
if this potential entrant is an US firm (or European) and comes from the radio industry 
(or from other sectors) are attributes very near to our definition of A-variables. This 
difference is quite in line with Winter's (1987) distinction of “state'' versus “control” 
strategic variables, that is “the distinction between aspects … that are not subject to 
choice over a short time span and aspects that are'' (p. 162). 
Following this view and some ad-hoc literature (Carroll et al., 1996), the decision of 
entry (yes or not) should depend mostly by A-variables, while the decision of entry 
timing should be mainly influenced by firm B-attributes. This means that firm decision 
to enter (or not to enter) in a new market is influenced mainly by structured, stable 
firm characteristics, while firm entry timing, given the entry, is linked with the firm 
endogenous attitude to be a successful early-comer (or late-comer) in that particular 
market. Fixed the values for predetermined variables, firm entry behaviour should 
depend from some strictly endogenous parameters.  
How can this be? Some of the previous argumentations provide the answer. 
Common sense tells us that it should be more plausible to observe an entry attempt 
into the US television-receiver market from an US radio manufacturer compared to 
an Italian canned food producer. But taken two US radio producers (and so a similar 
probability to enter), we should observe different entry timing decisions according to 
the different technological and marketing strengths of the two organizations. This line 
of reasoning leads to the second set of hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: With no inertia, predetermined firm characteristics affect the 
decision of “entry” versus “not entry” while specific endogenous, competence-
grounded firm variables influence the entry timing decision 
 
 
We turn now to the inertia assumption. From the Hypothesis 1b, the inertial decision 
procedure is similar to a repetitive decision of entry versus not entry that each period 
firms repeat. Entry timing is only a sub-product of this routinized process of decision. 
Under this assumption, firms do not take entry decision with a long run prospective, 
looking simultaneously at all the possible choices available. Firms decide whether 
entering with an early entry, or not. If they do not enter, they will review their decision 
in a late period. In doing so, inertial firm decisions are driven only by predetermined 
A-variables. If inertial firms collapse the twofold (entry and  timing) decision in a 
                                                 
9 This example takes inspiration from Klepper and Simons (2000).   11
unique type of repeated decision, the B-variables that should affect entry timing do 
not operate.  
 
 
Hypothesis 2b: With inertia, competence-grounded endogenous variables do 
not influence the entry timing decision. Only the predetermined firm 





From 1989 to 2000, among the 471 firms that entered in the market for encryption 
products, 6.15% were incumbents (entry by diversification), while 93.85% were start-
ups (entry by new firm formation). The total number of products released in the 
market since 1989 is 1,269; large established firms account for 16.39% of these 
software packages. As stated before, this analysis focuses only on incumbent entry 
decisions, leaving for further research the study of start-up dynamics (see 
Giarratana, 2004). We agree in fact with some scholars (Bhide, 2000; Smith and 
Cooper, 1988) that entry by diversification is a different phenomenon compared to 
entry by new firm formation and it is better to analyze these issues separately. 
From our database, we build a sample of 174 established firms which could be 
defined as potential entrants in ESI. We identify as potential entrants, firms that were 
granted at least a patent in 380 class from 1976 to 1999, or firms that signed at least 
a marketing alliance in ESI in the period 1990-1999, or firms that entered in ESI. 
Table 4 shows some preliminary statistics of potential entrants by sector. Differences 
in the average values for most  variables are quite evident, confirming the 
heterogeneity of this sample. 
 
[Table 4 about here.] 
 
Graph 2 shows the distribution of incumbent entry timing; it is worth noting that the 
median value equals 8, meaning that 50% of all the incumbents enter after a lag of 8 
years from the product pioneer. This suggests that the reaction response of 
incumbents is characterized by some sort of wait-and-see attribute. 
 
[Graph 2 about here.] 
 
Following a standard methodology (Klepper and Simons, 2000), the empirical 
analysis will be conducted as follows: first we perform a Logit model to test the 
probability to enter and a Cox duration model to highlight the main drivers of the entry 
time dynamics. Then we try to collect the results in a unique estimation with a 
generalized Tobit model, testing whether data from ESI resemble more a rational 
than an inertial behavior. 
Table 5 shows proxies used to capture the phenomenon. 
 
[Table 5 about here.] 
 
We divide the covariates in the two different groups; the first is composed by general 
sector and economic variables that, not directly linked with the ESI market, are 
neither directly controlled by firms nor modifiable in the short run (A-variable). The   12
second is formed by B-variables that could be defined as assets tailored specifically 
to influence the entry in ESI and that firm could easily modify in the short run. In other 
words, potential entrants could be depicted by some characteristics that are quite 
generic and some that are strategic to enter in ESI. Below are further specifications 
on these variables: 
 
• PAT  tries to capture firm confidence and ability in catching-up strategies. The 
sounder the firm technological portfolio in cryptology, the more is firm confidence in 
overruling entry barriers, at least technological ones. In an entry timing regression 
model, Schoenecker and Cooper (1998) proxied firm R&D intensity with R&D 
expenditures. In this paper, patents represent a more accurate measure given that 
we can select with high precision the technological class that is strategic for the 
industry. 
• ALL proxies firm evaluation of a new market's risks. The fact that a firm signs a 
number of commercial alliances in a sector before  entry may signal the high level of 
market uncertainty perceived by this firm. Roughly speaking, taken two similar firms 
entered in a sector at the same time, their different number of pre-entry collaborative 
linkages should signal the different level of risk perceived by the firms
10. It is a 
common strategy to use collaborative links as a mean to build a dedicated sales 
force and test market effective profitability. For the alliances we use the same sector 
precision as in the case of patents, selecting only the agreements classified with the 
SIC code 73726 (Encryption Software Sector). 
• EXIT  is a proxy of the level of competition inside the sector. It measures the 
commonly perceived risk of failure on new market. 
• PROF  measures the proportion between the size of the new market and the 
existing profit of the incumbent. This covariate aims to test the Aron and Lazear’ 
(1990) assumption that firm tend to seek risky new markets when profits in existing 
businesses are decreasing. 
• INT  proxies the existing opportunity cost between the returns of the financial un-
risky investments and the actual return of investments of the firm business. This 
variable captures the impact of liquidity constrains on firm's likelihood of pioneering 
new niches. On a work on firm financial constraints and firm behavior, Greenwald 
and Stiglitz (1990) suggest in fact “to relate variable like investment directly to firm 
financial conditions and to conditions of uncertainty ... in the economy at large" (p. 
165). 
• S ector dummies aim to capture the technological and downstream distance 
between sectors. The hypothesis is that due to technological and downstream 
proximities, it is easier to enter in ESI being a software firm rather than an electric 
component producer (see for example Teece et al., 1994). We introduce four dummy 
variables: software (SFW), hardware (HDW), diversified electronics (ELE) and 
telecommunications (TLC)
11. 
In order to control for firm size, we prefer to standardize by size firm-specific 
covariates rather than introducing size as a covariate. This is in order to avoid 
                                                 
10  Firms often use collaborative agreements in order to explore new markets and accumulate 
knowledge on them. The number of pre-entry alliances could signal the firm’s need to obtain 
information on a particular sector. The more the information needed, the riskier is the firm perception 
of a market. At this regard see the Special Issue on “Strategic Network" of the Strategic Management 
Journal, 21 (2), 2000. 
 
11 We do not introduce the “OTHER" dummy to avoid singularity during the econometric tests.   13
collinearity problems and to let firm specific variables play a more visible role. 
However, in Appendix B it is possible to find estimations using also these variables. 
For those firms that did not enter until 2000 we make the assumption that they will 
never enter (data are right censored). This could also be true according to Mitchell's 
“dual clocks" theory (Mitchell, 1989). This theory affirms that potential entrants could 
not wait long after the entry of first large incumbents (such as IBM, H&P and 




The first estimation proposed is a standard Logit model, where the dependent 
variable assumes the value of 1 if the incumbent entered the market, 0 otherwise. 
Results are in Table 6. As predicted, only A -covariates explain the probability to 
enter. The probability to enter is only affected by the level of firm existing profits 
compared to the size of the new market, by sector proximities and by firm financial 
constrains. Hypothesis 1 is wholly confirmed. 
 
[Table 6 about here.] 
 
The second model is a Cox duration model, which specifies the hazard of entry of 
firm i in year t as h it = f(t)exp(bxi), where the dependent variable is the probability of 
firm entry in year t for firms that have not yet entered by year t.  
 
[Table 7 about here.] 
 
Maximum likelihood estimates of the Hazard model are in Table 7. B-covariates that 
represent firm tailored capabilities to enter in ESI do not affect the hazard of entry. 
On the other side, firm financial constrains, the software dummy and the low level of 
firm failure on the new market contribute to earlier entry. Hypothesis 1.b holds. 
 
In order to reconsider these findings, we finally estimate a generalized Tobit equation 
(Amemiya, 1987), that merges the two previous models in a unique estimation. The 
generalized Tobit can be written as: 
 
Y= aYXA + bYXB + e      {  Z= aZXA + bZXB + g     
where Y = 0,1 is the dependent variable capturing the entry decision, Z =1,2,3 … is 
the dependent variable capturing the entry timing decision, XA and XB the two groups 
of covariates. The generalized Tobit in fact allows us to test separately the two types 
of decisions and the corresponding different magnitude and significance of 
coefficients in the two equations. 
According to model results, under inertial assumption we expect that only the A -
variables should be significant in explaining both the entry and the entry timing 
decision. In the case of full efficient behavior, the A-variables explain the decision of 
                                                 
12 Interviews conducted confirm this point. A product manager of a leading startup in ESI said: “Now 
there is no room for new vendors. A new competitor will find very hard times to gain market shares". 
Source: direct interview. 
   14
entry, while the B -variables a ccount for the decision of time of entry. So in 
econometric terms: 
 




bY = aZ  = 0 if the inertial hypothesis does not hold. 
 
Given this clarification, we estimate a generalised Tobit model using  the above 
covariates.  Looking at the results (see Table 8), firm B-characteristic parameters 
(PAT and ALL) do not appear to be significant, while A-variables are significant in 
both the regressions. The inertial behavior seems be confirmed by ESI data 
(hypothesis 2.b). Data strengthen the assumption that incumbents adopt routinized, 
adapting mechanisms of decision that do not take in account all the available 
strategic instruments. Firm B-variables do not enter in the process of entry decision 
as a relevant strategic tool, while A-variables are strongly the drivers of firm behavior. 
Roughly speaking, firm entry timing decisions (in this case late or early) are blurred 
beyond a process of repetitive “rule of the thumb'' interpretation of the competitive 
landscape. In so noticing, firm entry timing selection is not the direct outcome of a 
process of rational decision on timing, given the entry decision, but it is a “sub-
product'' of an entry-vs-no entry algorithm that each time firms activate until there is a 
window of opportunity. In order to confirm this view, we calculated the Pearson 
correlation coefficient among residuals of the two estimations,  e and  g.  The 
correlation coefficient equals 0.377 with a significance level of 0.002. 
 
[Table 8 about here.] 
 
Moreover, Table 9 shows some descriptive statistics for the most populated entry 
time cohorts. It is clear-cut that inside these cohorts there is high heterogeneity 
among firms. Why firms that are so different take the same entry timing decision? 
Our answer  is that, fixed the A-variables, entry timing decisions of dissimilar firms 
could coincide, if B-variables are negligible elements in firm decision processes. 
 
[Table 9 about here.] 
 
We want to highlight that we introduce as firm-specific covariates two variables that 
are tailored to model the entry in ESI, because directly correlated with the ability of 
incumbents to enter in this market. A previous work (Giarratana, 2004) showed that 
these are the main factors beyond start-ups success in ESI. This point is one of the 
major novelties of this paper: firm specific competences that should influence entry 
timing are unimportant
13. However, to allow a more general interpretation of the 
phenomenon, we try to perform again the generalised Tobit using other (and more 
generic) firm specific variables like firm sales, firm age and firm level of 
diversification
14 . The results
15 do not change since also these variables appear to be 
not significant. The T-statistics for Log(sales) in the Probit equation is 1.150 (p-value 
                                                 
13 This holds also when PAT and ALL are not standardized for firm size. 
14  Firm diversification is proxied using the Herfindahl index calculated on firm   trademarks over the 
period. Data were downloaded from the USPTO Patent   Office. 
15 See Appendix B.   15
0.25) and 0.586 (p-value 0.557) for the regression equation. For the age variable the 
T-statistics is -1.745 (0.08) and 1.807 (0.07) and for firm diversification 0.458 (0.654) 
and 0.785 (0.442). 
If we think that firms are to some extent inertial, the most obvious effect is the 
similarities of entry timing patterns among different firms. Geroski and Mazzuccato 
(2001) have coined the term of “speculative bubble'' to assess a highly optimistic 
forecasts of future profitability of new markets that led to high rate of entry in similar 
periods.  ESI data show that firms take entry timing decisions not considering firm 
specific assets that could favour the entry process. This clearly satisfies the evidence 
that entry is not a smooth, homogeneous phenomenon, but it occurs in waves 
(Geroski, 1995). Assuming firm heterogeneity, if entry decisions were influenced by 
firm specific B -variables, we would observe a homogenous, poorly concentrated 
distribution of firms over different entry time options. If every firm has its o wn 
characteristics, so it should have its own optimal entry timing decision. While if sector 
and external variables are the drivers of the phenomenon, entry timing decisions will 
be with high probability identical among potential entrants, leading to points of firm 
entry agglomeration in time
16.  
Data in ESI confirm this finding. Graph 3 shows the growth rates of gross entry in 
ESI. It is evident the wave morphology of the entry process in this industry. 
 
[Graph 3 about here.] 
 
We now discuss specifically the meaning of each estimate: 
- PROF is significant in the entry decision, but not in the entry timing decision. This 
means that, given the entry, the size of firm actual business, compared to the size of 
new markets, does not affect the decision of time of entry. The sign is in line with 
prediction: the less is the level of the profits in the existing business, the higher is the 
firm probability to enter in new business. 
- EXIT is significant when decision of entry timing is considered. The positive sign of 
the estimate stresses that when the rate of firm exit is high, firms tend to postpone 
entry. The more the risk of failure, the more a wait-and-see strategy is played. 
- INT is significant in both the regressions. In the first regression, its sign is positive; 
this finding means that the less is firm ROI, compared to the un-risky investment, the 
more the firm will try diversification strategies. In the entry timing regression, the sign 
is negative which means that the higher is this ratio, the earlier will firm enter. This is 
also in line with the predictions.  
- SECT Sector dummies are very important in the entry decision process. All 
dummies are significant. Data confirm an important regularity: among all firms it was 
easier to enter in ESI for software or hardware producers. Sector proximities make a 
difference; this finding is quite important because to find this hypothesis tested in 
literature is quite uncommon. In the entry timing decision process, only the software 
dummy variable remains significant, indicating that sector differences count less in 
the process of entry timing decision. 
Trying to draw some general insights from these results, the entry decision is 
influenced mainly by the proximity between the new and the firm core business and 
by the level of expected average profitability of the new market, compared to the 
existing level of firm profits. Conversely, entry timing decision is determined by the 
                                                 
16  The fact that some imitative behaviour exists among potential entrants could only corroborate the 
evidence that control variables poorly contribute in the entry process.   16





Several policy implications arise from this work. First, incumbents, especially large 
firms with consolidated catching-up strategies, tend to enter late into new product 
fields. Opening and testing new market niches is not a job that every firm wants to 
perform. But if latecomers are also the owners of the technology required in new 
markets, and they strongly protect their technology against use by potential entrants, 
this could lower the diffusion of innovations and the pace of new market generation. 
Particular attention should be given to the breadth and the length of patent 
protection, in a way that it should not harm both the incentives to innovate and the 
innovative application of existing knowledge by other firms (Merges and Nelson, 
1990). The case of ESI is a good example: patents that act as a technological base 
for further enhancements in cryptology are twenty years old, without any strong 
protection from other firm applications. This point should be linked to the recent trend 
of some high-tech firms to place barriers on the mobility of high-skilled personnel not 
allowing for example their researchers to form spin-offs. Literature indicates that the 
exploration and testing of new markets is one of the most important roles performed 
by start-ups, a role that large established firms do not always want to play. This start-
up function could be slowed down through an excessive protection of proprietary 
knowledge by incumbents. In ESI the most successful founders had work experience 
in large ICT firms, with high technological and organization capabilities (Giarratana, 
2004).  
The second point is that if firms are inertial, they will take their entry decisions looking 
mainly to pre-determined, quasi-fixed variables. According to these predictions, firm 
entry decisions could easily collide. This is not against the evidence that entry occurs 
in waves. Homogenous entry decisions could convey congestion in markets with an 
excess of competition in some phases of industry history, causing a replication of 
investments and research projects, and increasing the rate of firm failure. Our 
suggestion is that policy interventions and venture capital strategies should be 
redirected to sustain entry not only when new markets are “fashionable", but 
whenever firm entry is grounded on sound and innovative competences. 
 
 
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
 
This paper was centered on the issue of incumbent entry timing in ESI. We have 
separated the different strategic outcomes depending on the level of inertia that could 
hit potential entrants. Then, we have tested our assumptions on ESI data, finding 
evidence to support, as we defined it, a “myopic”, inertial behavior of incumbent 
firms. More precisely, we have found that firm specific competences do not play a 
significant role in incumbent entry timing strategies. We have suggested that this 
could be explained by an assessment process that fails to accommodate the full logic 
of decision. 
But these findings open the table for further discussions. At this regard, two could be 
the models underneath this evidence. The hypothesis sustained along this paper 
claims that incumbents suffer from inertia in entry decision processes, overlooking   17
some assets that could improve their competitive position in new markets. This 
implies that incumbent entry performance is sub-optimal and it could be increased if 
firms adopt a more rational use of their resources. 
But another explanation, not yet discussed, could be that incumbents do not compete 
in new markets using timing of entry as a strategic variable, considering irrelevant 
firm assets that influence entry timing. Which of these assumptions is the real 
mechanism beyond incumbent entry patterns? 
Further works that includes an extensive survey among managers of incumbent firms 
could give new insights over this problem. Nonetheless, we try to link these two 
hypotheses with one of the question posed at the beginning of this work: whether 
large incumbents to some extent “forget" their technological inventories allowing 
technological imitators to dominate new market niches. Answering this question 
claims a carefully analysis. From one side, and also our analysis is consistent with 
that, for incumbents the timing of entry in a technological and in a product race are 
different. Incumbents enter early into new technological fields, maybe because they 
use competences embedded in existing products (Gambardella and Torrisi, 1998), 
probably without any considerations about the possibility to exploit these capabilities 
in future markets. 
But building a large, diversified technological base could be a necessary condition to 
maintain a chance to enter promptly into new markets when an inertial entry decision 
will be taken. These incumbents simply set a strategy of “not being too far" at least 
technologically (Schnaars, 1994). Along this view, large incumbents do not “forget" 
part of their technological portfolio. They often invest in searching along the new 
technological trajectories, even if they wait to enter into new product markets. At this 
regard, the persistence of large firm patenting in cryptology is quite striking. Building 
a large diversified technological portfolio could reduce the cost of playing a wait-and-
see strategy, increasing simultaneously the probability to play this strategy. Sound 
investments in firm ability to be late-comers, namely investing in a wide firm 
knowledge base, could be a necessary condition (and maybe the only) to sterilize the 
harmful effects of inertia. Otherwise, and predictions could be straight on this point, 
incumbents that do not consider the right entry timing will experience a higher 
probability of failure. To be clearer, maybe only for fat-competence organizations 
entry timing could poorly influence firm performance in new sectors and it can be 
considered an irrelevant strategic tool. But adapting rules of decision that could give 
high payoffs to these fat-competence firms could not guaranteed  the same results if 
transferred to other organizations. Our data show that not all the incumbents are fat-
competence organizations and for these companies, missing the starting gun could 
be a key issue.  
ESI gives a quintessential example of wrong entry timing decision that causes firm 
failure. SystemSoft was a medium size company specialized in operating system 
design that has tried to exploit ESI rising demand since 1993. It focused its 
production on utility software programs and developed system-level software that let 
a PC's hardware communicate with its operating system. Following this strategy, it 
signed several technological and marketing agreements with large ICT firms and in 
1996 it bought Radish Communications System, with the aim of integrating Radish's 
competencies in data transmission technology. But Systemsoft never coped with its 
direct competitors like Network Associates and Symantec that entered in the sector 
some years before. After having realized a loss in 1997, the firm tried to react with 
cost saving strategies but in 1999 the company filed for bankruptcy protection. In   18
1999 Systemsoft sold off its assets to Rocket Software (BusinessWire, 1999). Similar 
case studies could also be found in other sectors
17. 
Trying to conclude, one of the major questions that this work has raised is the 
following: are we dealing with problems of entry decision inertia  or incumbent 
competitive advantages are not influenced by entry timing in new markets? 
The issue could find an answer assuming that incumbents could be affected by 
inertia, but that the strategic relevance of entry timing decreases with firm age, 
experience, size and knowledge base breadth. Therefore, wrong entry timing 
decisions could be less damaging for fat-competence organizations, since when 
firms become large, entry timing loses its strategic value
18.  Some empirical evidence 
showing a positive relationship between firm performance and strategic decision 
speed could give more corroboration to the latter point (Baum and Wally, 2003). 
Unfortunately, one evident limitation of this work is that we could not measure the 
post-entry performance of all incumbents in ESI. To have a rough proxy of incumbent 
performance in ESI, we have checked in the US Trademarks database if the firms 
entered in ESI still own some trademarks referred to encryption software products at 
December 2002, after two years from our sample period
19. At 2002 39.2% of 
incumbents that entered in ESI do not own any live trademarks in encryption 
software, quite sound evidence that these firms exited the market. The two 
incumbents that own the most live trademarks in encryption software are not 
surprising the two “fattest” competence firms in our sample: IBM (28) and H&P (10). 
Moreover, direct interviews conducted with some start-up managers confirm that 
leading early-comer start-ups have gained sound first mover advantages, especially 
in terms of  downstream assets and product reputation. In these interviews, it 
surprisingly emerged that often start-ups does not perceive large incumbents as 
direct competitors, even if they started to sell their own products in ESI. Start-ups 
keep referring to large  firms as best customers or best partners. It seems that 
incumbents are not playing a leading role in this industry and some problems in the 
entry timing process should exist. 
We are aware that entry process is analyzed in a particular niche of software industry 
characterized by low entry and exit barriers and high turbulence. These 
characteristics affected the modality of entry and the decision processes activated by 
potential entrants. Further works should investigate these issues in other industries.  
Finally, let us conclude with a challenging point, though speculative. This paper has 
disclosed how inertial behavior reduces the strategic value of firm-specific, dynamic 
capabilities. Even with perfect information on all the variables, firm top managers 
should be aware that strategic mistakes could also reside in a biased cognitive 
balance of the strategic instruments available. At this regard, we think that the 
                                                 
17 See for example WMX technologies case (Forbes, 1993). 
 
18  Being a large, long-living diversified firm often means that past entry timing decisions were 
successful, especially in the early firm history. Given this, any scholar could suggest that long-living, 
fat-competence firms are those that have used rational entry decision processes in the first stages of 
their growth. It could be of great interest to test this hypothesis in further works. 
 
19 For incumbents entered in ESI, we checked for all the trademarks that 1) are live at December 2002; 
2) in the Good and Service description include the words “software” and “encryption or encrypting or 
security or secure”. It is worth noticing that a trademark could be dismissed by firms (abandon) or by 
the USPTO authority (cancellation) after 6 years from the registration if the trademark is not used 
anymore. This means that the effective date of exit is observed with delay.   19
difference in the extent of performance could lie not only in the quality of the 
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APPENDIX A: DATA SOURCE  DESCRIPTIO
 
Patent data are downloaded from the US Patent Office web site,(www.uspto.gov). 
We considered all the patents in the US class 380 (Cryptography) that include 
“equipment and processes wh ich a) conceal or obscure intelligible information 
by transforming such information so as to make the information intelligible 
to a casual or un -authorized recipient, or b) extract intelligible information 
from such a concealed representation, including br eaking of unknown codes 
and messages"  (see Us Patent Office classification manual). For each patent we 
extracted all the information reported in the on-line front page of the patent (issue 
date, assignee, citations, inventors). 
Information about alliances  was drawn from Infotrac's Insite Promt database 
(www.insitepro.com), that reports four categories of firm events (strategic alliances, 
joint ventures, M&As) from a large set of trade journals, magazines and other 
specialized press. For the period 1993-1999 we downloaded all the events included 
in the SIC Code 73726 (Encryption Software Sector). 
Products introduction data were taken from Infotrac's General Business File ASAP 
database, downloading all the press articles that report a “Product announcement", 
”New software release" and “Software Evaluation" in the security software sector. 
Firm entry was assigned when the first firm product was released in the market.  
Firm's financial data were taken from Hoover's (www.hoovers.com), an on-line 
database, which collects data for the Security Software & Services industry. 
Data on the structure of firm groups (including subsidiaries) were taken from 
Business and Company Resource Center database, Gale Group's Infotrac. 
APPENDIX B: ALTERNAT IVE ESTIMATION
Log of Likelihood Function =  -95.0303   N=174 
Variable    Estimate   S.E.   T-Test  
Probit Estimation 
Costant   -4.576  1.032  -4.432 
AGE        -2.181         1.250        -1.745  
SIZE         0.056         0.049         1.150  
PROF         0.068         0.063         1.069  
INT         1.330         0.129          10.2  
EXIT       -47.160         4.830         -9.74  
HDW         1.219         0.378         3.222  
SFW         1.134         0.331         3.425  
ELE         0.248         0.312         0.792  
Regression Estimation 
Costant       -6.758         2.537        -2.664  
AGE         4.349         2.406         1.807  
SALES        0.118         0.201         0.586  
PROF        0.046         0.014         3.321  
EXIT       -50.620         0.928       -54.542    23
INT         -0.491         0.544        -0.902  
HDW         2.328         0.809         2.878  
SFW         2.417         1.348         1.793  
ELE         0.305         1.816         0.168  
 Table 1: Most cited firms in 380 USPTO Class, sample patents 1976-1992 
Firm   Citations (C)   Patents (P)  C/P  
IBM  528  46  11.47 
Motorola  226  24  9.41 
Scientific Atlanta  202  18  11.22 
Pitney Bowes  165  16  10.31 
Qualcomm  97  3  32.33 
AT&T  97  8  12.12 
Pioneer  95  9  10.55 
Philips  95  7  13.57 
Aisin Seiki  83  6  13.83 
Stanford University  80  2  40 
M.I.T.  75  2  37.5 
NEC  72  6  12 
General Instr.  68  8  8.5 
NCR  63  5  12.6 
Hitachi  62  4  15.5 
VISA  53  2  26.5  
Total  2061  166  17.34 




Table 2: Top firms for patents granted 1993--1999 in 380 USPTO Class 
Top firms  Country  Sector  Patents granted 
IBM   USA  Computer  195 
Motorota  USA  Telecom  175 
Sony  Japan  Electronics  71 
Scientific Atlanta  USA  Telecom  64 
Pitney Bowes   USA  Computer  61 
Matsushita   Japan  Electronics  54 
ATT   USA  Telecom  52 
Fujitsu   Japan  Computer  50 
Compaq  USA  Computer  44 
Toshiba  Japan  Computer  43  
Total      809 














Table 3: Top firms cited by “ESI 1998 market leader'' patents at 1999 
Firm cited  Numbers of Citations 
IBM  43 
Motorota  27 
Compaq—HP  23 
Science Applications   19 
AT&T  18 
Sun  14 
Matsushita  13 
Secure Computing  13 
NSA Labs  11 
Interdigital  9 
Total  190 
Other  256 
Source: USPTO 
 
Table 4: Sample composition. Potential entrants in ESI by sector, 1989-2000 
(average values) 








Electronics  46  1.61  17.25  1.42  16,612 
Hardware  29  2.30  29.05  4.70  9,137 
Software  32  1.78  9.54  0.09  2,084 
Telecommunications  29  1.81  25.08  2.21  13,274 
Other  38  1.81  8.29  0.19  71177 
Total  174         
Source: Infotrac, USPTO, Hoover’s 
 
Table 5: Covariates description 
A variables 
PROF  Ratio between firm profit in existing businesses and average 
profit in ESI 
INT  Ratio between annual average interest rates of US Treasury 
Bonds and annual firm Return of Investment. 
EXIT  Ratio between firm exit and entry rate in ESI 
HDW  Sector dummy for hardware incumbents 
SFW  Sector dummy for software incumbents 
TLC  Sector dummy for telecommunication incumbents 
ELE  Sector dummy for diversified electronic incumbents 
B variables 
PAT  Pre-entry number of firm patents in 380 USPTO class 1976-
1999, weighted by citations, standardised by firm size (logsales) 
ALL  Pre-entry number of firm commercial alliances in the sector, 
standardised by firm size (logsales) 
 





Table 6: Results of Logit estimation – Entry probability 
Log Likelihood =  -51.4764    N=174 
Variable    Estimate   S.E.   T-Test  
Constant   -5.766  1.417  -4.066 
PAT   0.011  0.25  0.046 
ALL   0.455  0.258  1.759 
PROF   -0.495  0.147  -3.364 
EXIT   0.103  0.124  0.831 
INT   0.234  0.092  2.543 
HDW   4.139  1.434  2.885 
SFW   4.005  1.43  2.799 
TLC   2.627  1.377  1.907 





Table 7: Results of Cox estimation - Hazard of entry 
Log Likelihood =  -83.9502     N=174 
Variable    Estimate   S.E.   T-Test  
PAT   -0.005  0.003  -1.379 
ALL   0.082  0.261  0.313 
PROF   0.006  0.010  0.560 
EXIT   -7.770  1.496  -5.192 
INT   0.986  0.325  3.034 
HDW   1.460  1.046  1.396 
SFW   2.447  1.013  2.416 
TLC   1.637  0.984  1.662 






















Table 8: Results of generalised Tobit estimation 
Log of Likelihood Function = -97.7161     N=174 
Variable    Estimate   S.E.   T-Test  
Probit Estimation 
Constant   -2.592    0.271   -9.565  
PAT    0.000    0.001   -0.588  
ALL    0.646    0.358    1.806  
PROF   -2.978    1.090   -2.731  
EXIT    0.154    0.100    1.537  
INT    0.346    0.109    3.161  
HDW    2.358    0.353    6.671  
SFW    1.470    0.288    5.102  
TLC    1.054    0.271    3.893  
ELE    1.075    0.251    4.281  
Regression Estimation 
Constant   11.022    1.573   7.009  
PAT    0.000    0.000   -1.592  
ALL    0.274    0.502    0.545  
PROF   -0.018    0.086   -0.205  
EXIT    3.460    1.526    2.267  
INT   -0.165    0.075   -2.202  
HDW    2.712    1.815    1.495  
SFW   - 3.909    1.798   - 2.174  
TLC    3.240    2.721    1.191  




Table 9: Descriptive statistics of most populated entry cohorts 
  Alliances 
Entry Time 
Cohort  12  10  9  8  7 
Average  3.5  2.8  22.6  4.42  3.33 
Stand. Dev.  2.12  2.38  7.76  3.69  3.21 
Max  5  7  29  10  7 
Min  2  1  14  1  1 
  Patents 
Average  42  11.8  32  34.1  20.6 
Stand. Dev.  16.97  7.46  22.11  72.8  35.7 
Max  54  19  57  198  62 
Min  30  2  15  0  0 
  Sales (‘000$) 
Average  11,737  5,800  1,896  14,284  21,159 
Stand. Dev.  16,561  5,011  841  27,625  36,555 
Max  23,448  12,983  2,631  76,347  63,370 
Min  27  652  979  6  52   27
Source: Infotrac, USPTO, Hoover’s 
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Figure 1: Entry, exit and firms on the market in ESI, 1989-2000 
 





Graph 2: Time distribution of incumbent entry in ESI, 1989 (0) – 2000 (12) 
 
Source: Infotrac Business Source ASAP 
 
 
   29
Graph 3: Growth rate of gross entry in ESI, 1990-2000 
 
Source: Infotrac Business Source ASAP 
 
 
 
 
 